Dependency management is one of the biggest challenges in modern software development.
Large projects often rely on dozens or even hundreds of libraries. Each one can introduce new vulnerabilities or even malicious code. Attackers sometimes upload fake packages to popular open-source repositories, hoping that build systems will download these packages automatically.
This problem is made worse by transitive dependencies, where a single library might include several other libraries under the hood. If any of those libraries have a known flaw, your entire application could be at risk without anyone realizing it.
We have seen real-world examples that prove how damaging this can be.
Let’s take a look at the Event-Stream hack. In this incident, an attacker injected code into a widely used JavaScript package, allowing the attacker to steal cryptocurrency keys. This is a good example of a dependency confusion attack where it took advantage of internal package names that were never claimed on public repositories. This allowed attackers to upload packages to public registries with higher version numbers, tricking build systems into downloading them.
Sonatype reports that supply chain attacks involving open-source components have skyrocketed in recent years. Snyk's data shows that many applications contain at least one publicly known vulnerability in a third-party library. All these examples confirm that dependency management is not just a theoretical problem.
Reducing Exposure to Dependency Attacks
One way to reduce exposure is to store your approved dependencies in a private repository. Systems such as Nexus Repository, Artifactory, or GitLab Package Registry can act as a controlled gate between your developers and external sources. Whenever a new library or a library update is needed, it first goes through automated security checks and possibly a manual review. Once it passes inspection, it is placed in the private repository so other engineers can use it safely. This process keeps malicious packages out of your build environment and also prevents developers from accidentally pulling in questionable code that has not been vetted.
Another crucial control is the Software Bill of Materials (SBOM).
This is an inventory that lists all the components in your application. It includes details such as library names, version numbers, and dependencies between components.
This comes into play when a critical vulnerability like Log4Shell is discovered, you can check your SBOM to see which of your systems might be affected.
Creating an SBOM is not difficult, as tools such as Syft or CycloneDX can generate these lists automatically during your build process. This setup helps security teams and developers respond quickly to new threats. It also adds transparency to the release process, since you always know exactly what is included in your software.
An SBOM can also prove useful if a client asks if your application is secure. You can simply show the client the list of materials so they can see for themselves that you have baked in security during the development process.
Extra layers of protection should be built into your continuous integration (CI) pipeline. Automated dependency-scanning tools will compare each library in your build against known vulnerability databases such as the National Vulnerability Database (NVD).
If a high-severity issue is found, the pipeline can block the build so no one mistakenly merges insecure code. Some teams add local or pre-commit checks on developer workstations to catch outdated or insecure dependencies before they ever reach the main branch.
Yet, another layer is code signing for build artifacts.
Every time you create a binary or Docker image, you sign it with a trusted key. The signature is verified by your release environment to ensure no one tampered with the artifact. Using ephemeral build agents that spin up for each job is also recommended because that lowers the risk of persistent malware in your pipeline.
All these measures address different blind spots in a threat model.
Private repositories lock out harmful packages that might appear on public registries.
SBOMs give you a live map of your dependencies so you can see where you are most exposed and react quickly to new disclosures.
Automated vulnerability checks stop known bad libraries from slipping into production.
Code signing ensures that attackers cannot quietly modify your builds without detection. Ephemeral build agents reduce the risk of a silent compromise that persists between builds.
In the end, a strong supply chain security program involves more than scanning code for bugs. It means controlling where your dependencies come from, mapping all your components, and setting strict policies for what can move through your CI pipeline. It also means signing artifacts to confirm integrity and running ephemeral build agents to keep attackers from hiding in your environment.
As attacks on open-source dependencies and build systems become more frequent, these practices are no longer optional. They are necessary for senior engineers and security teams who want to stay one step ahead of evolving threats.
