Trustwave SpiderLabs Exposes Unique Cybersecurity Threats in the Public Sector. Learn More

Trustwave SpiderLabs Exposes Unique Cybersecurity Threats in the Public Sector. Learn More

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Rilide: A New Malicious Browser Extension for Stealing Cryptocurrencies

Trustwave SpiderLabs uncovered a new strain of malware that it dubbed Rilide, which targets Chromium-based browsers such as Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Brave, and Opera.

Rilide malware is disguised as a legitimate Google Drive extension and enables threat actors to carry out a broad spectrum of malicious activities, including monitoring browsing history, taking screenshots, and injecting malicious scripts to withdraw funds from various cryptocurrency exchanges.

Rilide is not the first malware SpiderLabs has observed using malicious browser extensions. Where this malware differs is it has the effective and rarely used ability to utilize forged dialogs to deceive users into revealing their two-factor authentication (2FA) and then withdraw cryptocurrencies in the background. During our investigation into Rilide’s origins, we uncovered similar browser extensions being advertised for sale. Additionally, we found that part of its source code was recently leaked on an underground forum due to a payment dispute.

 

Malicious Campaigns Leading to Rilide Stealer Extension

SpiderLabs uncovered two malicious campaigns leading to the installation of the Rilide extension.

19809_image002

Figure 1. Infection Chains Leading to the Execution of the Rilide Extension

 

Campaign 1: Ekipa RAT Installing Rilide Stealer

One of the Rilide samples identified by Trustwave SpiderLabs was distributed through a malicious Microsoft Publisher file. This file is part of Ekipa RAT, a Remote Access Trojan (RAT), designed for targeted attacks and often sold on underground forums.

We previously described Ekipa RAT in one of our blogs. It is important to note that Microsoft Publisher was not affected by Microsoft's decision to block macros from executing files downloaded from the Internet. As a result, when a user attempted to open a Publisher file, they would receive a warning but could still enable the execution of malicious content by clicking the ‘Enable Macros’ button. On 14 February 2023, Microsoft issued an update that resolved the Publisher security flaw. With the implementation of the ‘Mark of the Web’ feature on the .pub file, users are now left with only one option, ‘Disable Macros,’ which should have been the case all along.

Any association between the threat actors behind Ekipa RAT and those using the Rilide infostealer remains unclear. However, it is probable that Ekipa RAT was tested as a means of distribution for Rilide, before finally switching to Aurora stealer.

19810_image004

Figure 2. Publisher’s macro and Document_Open procedure executing remote Excel Workbook

Three tasks were configured on the C2 server:

  1. Download payload from hxxps://nch-software[.]info/1/2[.]exe to %temp% directory as.txt
  2. Change downloaded file’s extension to .exe
  3. Execute the payload.

File 2.exe is a Rust-based loader, responsible for installing the Rilide extension for Chromium-based browsers.

 

Campaign 2: Aurora Stealer Abusing Google Ads

Aurora is a Go-based stealer, which was initially spotted being advertised in April 2022 as a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) on Russian-speaking underground forums. The malware is designed to target data from multiple web browsers, cryptocurrency wallets, and local systems.

Recently, the threat actors behind Aurora have been observed abusing the Google Ads platform to spread the malware. According to a report published by Cyble, campaigns mimicking legitimate Team Viewer installers have been utilized to deploy Aurora. As reported by @1ZRR4H and @malwrhunterteam, Aurora was also spread via another campaign that imitated an NVIDIA Drivers installer. A downloaded sample was packed with Themida, a well-known commercial protector for executables. We used the UnpacMe service to unpack the sample.

 

19811_image006

Figure 3. Aurora campaign imitating the NVIDIA Drivers installer as shown in 1ZRR4H’s Twitter post

 

Restoring Function Names

The Aurora Stealer sample was stripped of debugging symbols, thus making the analysis harder. Since Go binaries are statically linked, which means that all the necessary libraries are included in the compiled binary, the number of potential functions to analyze is large. However, the original function names can be restored from the pclntab structure, as described in the CUJOAI Senior Threat Researcher Dorka Palotay’s post. Using the go_func.py script for Ghidra we were able to restore the functions names.


How an Aurora Module Downloaded Rilide Stealer

One of the eight grabbing modules, configured in the analyzed sample, contained a base64 encoded blob of data storing the URL for the Rilide Rust-based loader. The payload, hosted on Discord CDN, was saved to the %temp% directory with filename <10-alpahnumeric-characters>.exe and executed via start-process PowerShell cmdlet.

 

19812_image008

Figure 4. Part of Aurora Stealer routine downloading and executing Rilide loader

 

The Common Link Between Two Campaigns

The Rilide Rust-based loader samples analyzed as part of the Aurora campaign were packed with a VMProtect commercial packer. After unpacking the samples and analyzing strings contained in the binary, we found multiple references to Windows paths in the C:\Users\ilide\ directory. The same username was observed in the PDB Path of the Rilide sample obtained from the Ekipa RAT campaign.

 

19813_image010

Figure 5. The same username in a path found in Rilide Rust-based loaders samples from both campaigns.

 

Rilide Stealer Extension Targeting Chromium-Based Browsers

Rilide leverages a Rust loader used to install the extension if a Chromium-based browser is detected. Rilide mimics benign Google Drive Extensions and abuses several built-in chrome functionalities. The loader modifies LNK shortcut files opening targeted browsers, so that they are executed with parameter --load-extension pointing to the dropped malicious Rilide extension.

 

19814_image012

Figure 6. Rilide Stealer extension mimicking Google Drive and looking at its manifest revealing the configured permissions

 

Rilide’s background script attaches a listener to the tabs.onActivated and webRequest.onHeadersReceived events and removes the Content Security Policy (CSP) directive for all requests. This allows the extension to perform an XSS attack and load external resources that would otherwise be blocked by the CSP. The app script adds another listener to the DOMContentLoaded event and retrieves a list of targeted domains from the C2. If the current domain matches any of the listed targets, designated scripts are injected into the webpage.

 

19815_image014

Figure 7. Configuration list indicating targets such as email services and cryptocurrency exchanges.

 

Additionally, the background script carries out regular checks on the browsing history and exfiltrates URLs that are matched against the targeted domain list. Moreover, it is capable of capturing and exfiltrating screenshots of the currently active tabs on demand.

 

19816_image016

Figure 8. Rilide Stealer Execution Flow and Functionalities

 

Automatic Cryptocurrency Withdrawal

Rilide’s crypto exchange scripts support automatic withdrawal function. While the withdrawal request is made in the background, the user is presented with forged device authentication dialog in order to obtain 2FA. Email confirmations are also replaced on the fly if the user enters the mailbox using the same web browser. The withdrawal request email is replaced with a device authorization request tricking the user into providing the authorization code.

 

19817_image018

Figure 9. Withdrawal Requests replaced with Authorize New Device emails in Gmail mailbox

 

19818_image020

Figure 10. Content of the original and forged email. The verification code was extracted from the original message body.

 

We found no substantial variations in the code between the samples dropped by Ekipa RAT and used in the Aurora Stealer campaign. Both campaigns utilized a Rust dropper, and the functionalities of the browser plugins are nearly the same.

 

19819_image022

Figure 11. Code differences between Rilide Stealer plugin samples, both using the same C2 server

 

Rilide Stealer Origins

In the course of our research, we have encountered several stealer extensions for sale that advertised capabilities closely resembling those of the Rilide samples. However, we were unable to definitively link any of them to Rilide. One noteworthy finding was a botnet sale advertisement from an underground forum dated March 2022. Although the advertised functionalities matched those of Rilide, the botnet also included additional features such as a reverse proxy and ad clicker. Notably, the botnet's automatic withdrawal function supported the same exchanges observed in the Rilide samples.

 

19820_image024

Figure 12. Underground forum post advertising sale of botnet with Rilide-like capabilities

 

On February 27, 2023, a member of the same underground forum posted a link to the source code for the Rilide extension, reportedly due to an unresolved payment dispute. The leaked source closely resembles that used in the Aurora Stealer campaign but did not contain any of the injected scripts observed in the campaign sample.

 

19821_image026

Figure 13. Underground forum post, dated February 27, 2023, containing a link to part of the Rilide extension source code.

 

Notably there is one feature implemented that is missing in the later versions - swapping cryptocurrency wallet addresses in the clipboard. The list of addresses to be replaced is hard coded in the source code.

19822_image028

Figure 14. Clipboard hijacking routine in the analyzed sample from the aforementioned forum post.

 

Pivoting on the Command-and-Control domain ashgrrwt[.]click hard coded in the sample, we identified additional Rilide loaders leading us to the GitHub user gulantin.

 

19823_image030

Figure 15. Github repository storing multiple Rilide loader and extension samples

 

Repositories created by this user contain loaders for the Rilide extension, but they are not Rust-based. The sample in the repository named ‘77’ is a .NET extension loader only for the Chrome browser, unlike the later Rust-based version that works for all Chromium-based browsers. Other loaders found in repositories 19 and 789 are based on Advanced Installer – a legitimate Windows Installer Packaging Tool for MSI installers.

 

19824_image032

Figure 16. Extension loading routine of the custom .NET loader from gulantin’s repository 77

 

The address contained in the domain variable that is supposed to store the C2 domain suggests that this version of a loader was still under development when submitted to GitHub.

 

19825_image034

Figure 17. Part of JavaScript configuration in the Rilide extension hosted on GitHub

 

Conclusions:

The Rilide stealer is a prime example of the increasing sophistication of malicious browser extensions and the dangers they pose. Disguised as a legitimate Google Drive extension, Rilide provides threat actors with the ability to carry out a wide range of malicious activities, including monitoring browsing history, capturing screenshots, and injecting malicious scripts to steal funds from cryptocurrency exchanges.

While the upcoming enforcement of manifest v3 may make it more challenging for threat actors to operate, it is unlikely to solve the issue entirely as most of the functionalities leveraged by Rilide will still be available.

Informational overload can dull our ability to interpret facts accurately and make us more vulnerable to phishing attempts. It is important to remain vigilant and skeptical when receiving unsolicited emails or messages, and to never assume that any content on the Internet is safe, even if it appears to be.

Ultimately, it is crucial to stay informed and educated about the latest cybersecurity threats and best practices to minimize the risk of falling victim to phishing attacks.

 

Indicators of Compromise:

Publisher File:

File name

Hash Type

Hash

Tes7777.pub

SHA256

0e31ff6406b03982581246b7dd60f3b96edcf0bd007b31766954df001fd68f69

SHA1

e049f56198c23d86e9083142bfe80042e21d4b8e

MD5

558104b26ccadec3d3eb2925113387a6


Aurora Stealer:

File name

Hash Type

Hash

PackageLauncher.exe

SHA256

e623984143e0dc6e35c79869ab1521c6714e588e8e648606496f8372ca0d8416

SHA1

b1c100d5a99ae34ccb3654c7b7f8573376a44fd9

MD5

c28a180de1f80c8c98d0904e64142bef

-

SHA256

ebd72806abd354f3162eec0991d127f993a5dde1a0c719b47087c9ee0edefeaf

SHA1

abaaa2644b1e84e8b39119988dd711572377c839

MD5

1baaeedd1a26edf4fa79ded370e3d19a

 

Rilide Loader:

File name

Hash Type

Hash

2.exe

SHA256

0f11aeecbde1f355d26c9d406dad80cb0ae8536aea31fdddaf915d4afd434f3f

SHA1

b4b918a5898463dad1c7d823e0b3f828bac15aad

MD5

0a4f321c903a7fbc59566918c12aca09

waBp.exe

SHA256

8342b134cddeaf34ce05bafa9e860dacf6cd01b85fd00147d90a350516c055e5

SHA1

25f3fb6d2dab206a5e9b2c0ef26ec6d6a56c5767

MD5

561797d7e5cf956e33735180d93be5b6

 

Rilide Extension:

File name

Hash Type

Hash

background.js

SHA256

4cc83be0fa496855d244050616ee2e86b044a9bc87bc5ca70b305986c1ba3bb8

SHA1

70167e7e5d71fba7d92796324b488c0fb9727712

MD5

766d020e902b6470d0510e5c6cfcd6e8

background.js

SHA256

55251c725e9f6f51b8db7a631b54dd85b1b59d644c3219e03ceffb0c49cd00a4

SHA1

a39d252e7927ae1adf518e6a3dd08f37e7ee7c26

MD5

d9cca3dd5bdaeb0466d52821b584602b

background.js

SHA256

1b01c3e554700e1282c7fdd2dcb54314516ee1f0c5eef3560cdbabc1ba776293

SHA1

ffebf78a9692293a23f9a477ea8a79f7f6ef5aa2

MD5

9e5f43b2dc1606e27fa0cfdfb4e363d2

app.js

SHA256

a28c623d120a76dcfeef9504eaeefabac9d33f292576ccf012fa458b8d7bc6ef

SHA1

a46586bfe22f4d84cd9174238740af275bf50c69

MD5

740606987f4d588c89d0a5b68648e31e

app.js

SHA256

8989f4244667626728c6c0083422ff714cb622c92c35a53f9cb1e9891f4528ff

SHA1

5012e783b2ee29cb40b04a10d1a40d0bfda683d9

MD5

1c54dd00bc7cc52b60ad4a46e2fb3a77

vpn.js

SHA256

170a13a7a8757336babe857804fa24b6cb20aaa9593b32546d7151f23095a510

SHA1

eafdc35b233600ef552b87e684faa3ab3396eae9

MD5

d54fa225b07298ec34be872cd4ebf4ae

manifest.json

SHA256

bb57a504e0b821552344cecb3da9ecdd0d61817264617a4917d6f5e64a1df7e5

SHA1

0cb1d9c2a3c8b776ef1e3ec1316fbf595ced7863

MD5

baee9ba0b94ea1e2b2e566fc8a615554

manifest.json

SHA256

d70e933e10e667ae7ef6e68a625c447be8aabe9b29affdad999c969bd8769003

SHA1

84db08e3dcbe40c7cbc998a77788f7303d4a2905

MD5

99dc4073f2fe91f48fd16bc65e7dcbc2

binance.js

SHA256

c8939f8d6237fcc17d486981a800b1e7e9974377de21d7e76677babe8ed536af

SHA1

f689396c73055e99a06e002c39e3a74d3d402607

MD5

2cc204564b68c5a98b1ff68d861b66c5

bitget.js

SHA256

2e310391d77022bcc708c354140319718777ca35efdfb76d6c80cb9de8c8091e

SHA1

05536aa80f8280ddc31be5c0ac3ca995f2190a0a

MD5

646b9404a29febe9f3741797b79e300c

blockchain.js

SHA256

4bbb0584eed0c082b5c43d3f259f37cf1a0b64eabb485e85090951a6566d98d4

SHA1

28ae2440c56350f65b607e4e99b67a2632db873b

MD5

253f4319673673d2bf5285558a6903df

bybit.js

SHA256

9dca66f52f31dca921fb238bd36bfc1b1a59d3e4af7b071da9bc4c6bf294e402

SHA1

61acdad59223a9eb0b392ccd085db1e49700d65

MD5

50e363409ba77b20fb6f0bce4eff7b1

coinbase.js

SHA256

4df0f18a7e05518bbe93758e751f1f462fef212cdc786c7217d50ddbda14efb5

SHA1

39f546a4ec94e63e603e3c2481fecab2b5e8a475

MD5

c1f40584e4ac391d97218ce137a63fb3

ftx.js

SHA256

ef20c929f5204b223b6e53dc406ea0bcd76d9e98c9ae4942037902883d4bb22a

SHA1

0ead1d32ce6b15c4a90373fce58d1554035cd40f

MD5

ebce63fdc8ef245f117f06ada3ba0f6d

huobi.js

SHA256

e1ad66cc0244fc075e0aabe0fd19502d4c9617829b90aa210e74be1d915275d2

SHA1

2449e4b27d778f6a4ffc00bb7b73926ac2c54e8a

MD5

4abe60d2c3506f4767e163d135f89f92

kraken.js

SHA256

a7f0fdfdfdf1ef65799fd2114bf5c1e133a8b7635b498b334553fbb64b218a05

SHA1

ec6de82efa93e59da148f4d696efcfca851e051e

MD5

b85c5659e946b5d7ad78410356288928

okx.js

SHA256

68278b40b59b1b0db2f814d2d864f0b9c2b4285f5795d22cabf60715f922989c

SHA1

415d790b54ca8e374f37fdbb00090110b823ba18

MD5

ff4e2df1a46d49862ab2a0af830a007e

gmail.js

SHA256

2f947644c7752ba014eae7971b247be60249a6088923c66ffe9886a7f5c5fe1c

SHA1

add0d61399c8c47f8ac73dc83cc83dfa31cddeca

MD5

c0e120778853f0a4865e006a07cd728a

 

Phishing Websites:

Malware

Domain

Aurora

nvidia-graphics[.]top

 

C2 Servers:

Malware

Domain

Ekipa RAT

nch-software[.]info

Aurora

45[.]15[.]156[.]210

Rilide

vceilinichego[.]ru

Rilide

ashgrrwt[.]click

 

Wallet Addresses:

Cryptocurrency

Address

BTC

bc1qkczacyp5jq29s5kaphth4asu8cv2y4u4gdgj7q

BTC

bc1qsjg8dqx6ga30h6szjd8dv2wg50ch50qrey4t7j

BTC

1KqequymujeNJuyB4gH7oJSFTB3En3Hf5n

ETH

0xDBc1330056E2F5e2FB11FB3C96dE2c44B313eA8d

LTC

LRYpzmnqBVozkbzJhTWndzYDPfjmNPyaLv

XRP

rUPTadzFN6LS662Z2d2AvNyqU1xwg2japJ

TRON

THiD8hFLiEyULVKLp3DSbBXQSbR3MQxm4X

DOGE

D5asYfjtbTtFmFkrEwqVgbJKYv9YT7Tgjh

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